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COMMENTS

CIVIL PROCEDURE-DISMISSAL AND NONSUIT-MANDATORY

Dis-

MISSAL*-Recent New Mexico cases have had considerable impact
on the meaning of the mandatory dismissal provision of Rule 41 (e)
of the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule, as amended,
provides that when the plaintiff has failed to take any action to bring
the litigation to a final determination for a period of three years
after the filing of the original complaint, any party may have the
case dismissed with prejudice upon the filing of a written motion,
unless a written stipulation signed by all parties has been filed postponing the action. Rule 41(e) does not apply to those cases in
which a jury trial has been demanded.' Although this Comment is
based upon decisions given when the rule specified a two-year time
limit, the 1965 amendment extending the time limit to three years
should not affect the future judicial interpretation of 41 (e), except,
of course, in cases in which a jury trial has been requested.
Generally the rule has been strictly construed, and its application
has been mechanical. The New Mexico Supreme Court held the dismissal provision to be mandatory in Ringle Dev. Corp. v. Chavez.2
But the court in Ringle indicated that some rather unclear exceptions
to a mandatory application of the rule might exist:
[E]xcept where the time is tolled by statute, such as the Soldiers'
and Sailors' Relief Act . . . or unless process has not been served
because of inability to execute it on account of the absence of the
defendant from the state, or his concealment within the state, or
unless from some other good reason, the plaintiff is unable, for causes
beyond his control, to bring the case to trial, the provision for dismissal is mandatory.3
*Martin v. Leonard Motor-El Paso, 402 P.2d 954 (N.M. 1965).
1. N.M.R. Civ. P. 41(e), codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-1-1 (41) (e) (Supp. 1965):
In any civil action or proceeding pending in any district court in this state,
when it shall be made to appear to the court that the plaintiff therein or any
defendant filing a cross complaint therein has failed to take any action to bring
such action or proceeding to its final determination for a period of at least
three [3] years after the filing of said action or proceeding or of such cross

complaint unless a written stipulation signed by all parties to said action or
proceeding has been filed suspending or postponing final action beyond three
[3] years, any party to such action or proceeding may have the same dismissed
with prejudice to the prosecution of any other or further action or proceeding
based on the same cause of action set up in the complaint or cross-complaint by
filing in such pending action or proceeding a written motion moving the dismissal thereof with prejudice. This section does not apply to any action or proceeding wherein a jury trial has been demanded.
2. 51 N.M. 156, 180 P.2d 790 (1947).
3. Id. at 159, 180 P.2d at 792.
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Beyond the indefinite exceptions established in Ringle, the supreme
court has held that dismissal under 41 (e) is not an occasion for the

exercise of judicial discretion.4

The supreme court has been reluctant to find exceptions that
would avoid application of the rule. The court has held that the taking of depositions, 5 the filing of a request for an admission of fact,6
motions made by the defendant during the two-year periodJ and
the use of discovery procedures' were not sufficient "actions" to toll
the statute. Similarly, the absence of two material witnesses from
the state was held an insufficient reason beyond a party's control for
taking no steps to bring the case to a final determination.'
The supreme court has further held that actions taken after expiration of the two-year period, but before a motion to dismiss was
made by the defendant, did not prevent the defendant from meritoriously filing a motion to dismiss under 41 (e). In Featherstone v.
Hanson,'° the plaintiff hired new attorneys, entered settlement negotiations, and paid fees to his attorneys. Nevertheless, the supreme
court affirmed dismissal with prejudice, saying that because the
4. Featherstone v. Hanson, 65 N.M. 398, 405, 338 P.2d 298, 301 (1959).
See also Foster v. Schwartzman, 4 N.M. Bar Bull. 233 (1965), decided by the supreme court on December 27th. In Foster, the plaintiff moved to have the trial court set
trial on the day the two-year statutory period would expire. (Foster was decided under
the two-year time limit of 41(e) prior to its amendment). The plaintiff's motion in
Foster was made seven days before two-year anniversary date. If the trial court was
unable to set trial, the plaintiff sought an alternative order to the effect that the motion
to set for trial was, in any event, sufficient action under 41(e) to prevent dismissal.
The trial court was unable to meet the trial date requested by the plaintiff and denied
the plaintiff's alternative motion that sufficient action had been taken by the plaintiff in
seeking a trial date to prevent dismissal under 41(e). Relying solely on 41(e), and
expressly declining to exercise its inherent power to dismiss for lack of diligence, the
trial court later dismissed the plaintiff's action with prejudice.
In an opinion written by Justice Chavez, the supreme court reversed. Language by
the court in Foster raises additional doubts regarding the future status of rule 41(e)
[W]e believe that, as a matter of law, [41(e)] is merely a standard as to
lack of diligence. It does not infer that inaction for a shorter period of time
may not also show a lack of diligence. The courts of this jurisdiction have
inherent power to dismiss actions for lack of diligent prosecution [Citations
omitted.]
4 N.M. Bar Bull. at 234.
5. Morris v. Fitzgerald, 73 N.M. 56, 385 P.2d 574 (1963).
6. Sender v. Montoya, 72 N.M. 287, 387 P.2d 860 (1963).
7. Gilman v. Bates, 72 N.M. 288, 383 P.2d 253 (1963).
8. Western Timber Prods. Co. v. W. S. Ranch Co., 69 N.M. 108, 364 P.2d 361
(1961).
9. Ringle Dev. Corp. v. Chavez, 51 N.M. 156, 180 P.2d 790 (1947).
10. 65 N.M. 398, 338 P.2d 298 (1959).
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plaintiff's actions were outside the court record they could not be
considered to deny a 41 (e) motion. The plaintiff's action must be
part of the court record before the supreme court will consider the
plaintiff's argument to resist dismissal." The fact that the defendant
had participated in the negotiations could not be considered because
the negotiations were not part of the record. The holding in
Featherstone, that the plaintiff's actions must be part of the court
record, has been reaffirmed in subsequent cases. Thus, rule 41(e)
has had the effect of a statute of limitations. 2
The foregoing discussion outlines two problems arising in the
application of rule 41 (e) : ( 1 ) Is dismissal always mandatory after
a lapse of two years (now three years) from the date the complaint
is filed? (2) What action or excuse is sufficient to avoid application
of rule ?
The New Mexico Supreme Court answered the first question
8 decided in 1965. In
in Martin v. Leonard Motor-El Paso,"
Martin,
the plaintiff-appellant appealed from a judgment dismissing his complaint pursuant to rule 41 (e). The complaint was filed June 7, 1961,
and dismissed without prejudice on the trial court's own motion on
August 21, 1963. The complaint was reinstated on the docket by
order of the district court on November 5, 1963, the date on which
the plaintiff filed a written motion requesting that the case be set
for trial. The motion for a trial setting was filed more than two
years after the original complaint was filed, but it was filed before
the defendant moved to dismiss under 41 (e) on January 17, 1964.
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The New Mexico
Supreme Court, held, Reversed and remanded, stating that the
defendant was required to invoke his right to dismiss before the
plaintiff took the requisite action to bring the case to a final determination. The court said:
The defendant slumbered while the plaintiff satisfied the requirements of Rule 41(e)14 and, therefore, his subsequent motion for dismissal came too late.
11. Featherstone v. Hanson, supra note 10; Morris v. Fitzgerald, 73 N.M. 56,
385 P.2d 574 (1963) ; Schall v. Burks, 74 N.M. 583, 396 P.2d 192 (1964) ; Sarikey v.
Sandoval, 404 P.2d 108 (N.M. 1965) ; Lovato v. Hicks, 4 N.M. Bar Bull. 229 (N.M.
Sup. Ct., Dec. 20, 1965).
12. Eager v. Belmore, 53 N.M. 299, 207 P.2d 519 (1949) ; City of Roswell v.
Holmes, 44 N.M. 1, 96 P.2d 701 (1939) (construing predecessor to present 41(e)).
13. 402 P.2d 954 (N.M. 1965).
14. Id. at 957.
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The Martin decision means that dismissal is not mandatory if the
plaintiff takes sufficient action to bring the case to a final determination before the defendant moves under 41(e), even though
the two-year period has passed. Although Martin seems to conflict with Featherstone,the two cases can be reconciled. In Feather.
stone, the plaintiff's actions to bring the case to trial were not part
of the court record; in Martin, they were. The plaintiff's action, if it
is part of the record and precedes the defendant's motion under
41 (e), will prevent dismissal.
Martin is not inconsistent with the holding in the Ringle case,
which set forth the unclear exceptions to the application of 41 (e) ;
Martin defines one of the exceptions of that holding. Mandatory
dismissal, previously undefined in a fact situation like Martin, will
result only if the defendant, at the expiration of the two-year period,
files his motion before the plaintiff takes sufficient action to bring
the case to final determination. In Martin, the plaintiff's action was
taken prior to the defendant's motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff's
action was in the court record. A combination of these two circumstances had never before been presented to the supreme court in a
41 (e) case. Although Martin appears to conflict with earlier decisions, it does not. Rule 41 (e) can still be a statute of limitations in
its effect, but this is true only if the defendant moves for dismissal
before the plaintiff takes sufficient action to satisfy the rule.
The Martin holding was reaffirmed in Beyer v. Montoya, 5 decided a week after Martin. In Beyer, the plaintiff obtained a trial
setting after expiration of the two-year period but before the defendant moved for a dismissal under 41 (e). The New Mexico Supreme
Court, held, Reversed and remanded:
Dismissal is mandatory only when a written motion under Rule
41
(e) is filed before plaintiff takes action toward final disposition,
even if that action is taken after the two-year period has expired
• . . [citing Martin].l6

After Martin and Beyer, the defendant cannot rely merely upon
the expiration of the time limit given in 41 (e) ; the defendant must
move to dismiss before the plaintiff takes sufficient action to bring
the case to final determination.
The second question remains: What activity by the plaintiff constitutes sufficient action or excuse to avoid dismissal? Martin and
15. 402 P.2d 960 (N.M. 1965).
16. Id. at 962-63.
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Beyer answer this question only to the extent that a request by the
plaintiff to set a trial date is sufficient action to avoid dismissal.
A third case, decided after Martin and Beyer, gives an example
of an action that will not be considered sufficient. In State ex rel.
City of Las Cruces v. McManus,'1 7 the plaintiff, Seaborn Collins,
filed his original complaint on January 12, 1961. On February 9,
1961, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action. According to the record, this motion was never ruled upon, partly because of difficulty encountered in
securing a presiding judge. Judge McManus was finally designated
to preside on May 22, 1962. In the interim, two judges had been
disqualified, and two other judges had declined to preside. Judge
McManus took the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to
state a cause of action under advisement but did not rule on it until
July 27, 1964, when he advised counsel by letter of his decision to
deny the motion.' 8 No order was entered in the record.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss under rule 41(e) on
August 5, 1964. The motion was denied. The defendant sought
mandamus to compel Judge McManus to dismiss the action. The
New Mexico Supreme Court, relying on Featherstone, ordered
dismissal of the plaintiff's suit:
[W]e are impressed that we must hold preliminary motions filed
but not ruled upon by the court will not prevent the running of the
statute, at least where, . . . the record does not disclose that the

court has been timely advised of the urgency of ruling on the pending motion with a request for a ruling and a setting for final disposition prior to a motion to dismiss under Rule 41 (e).19
The decision in City of Las Cruces shows that the court will continue to determine the adequacy of the plaintiff's action in the first
instance by requiring that it appear in the court record. If the plaintiff's action is not part of the record, City of Las Cruces seems to
indicate the supreme court's reluctance to consider the nature of
the plaintiff's action under the uncertain standards of Ringle to
determine if the action is sufficient to avoid dismissal. The New
Mexico Supreme Court said in Beyer that it was not receding from
the standards established in Ringle. ° Because the standards in
17.
18.
19.
20.

404 P.2d 106 (N.M. 1965).
Id. at 106.
Id. at 107-08.
Beyer v. Montoya, 402 P.2d 960 (N.M. 1965).
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Ringle are unclear, 2' it seems that the court will, as it said in Martin,
determine
each case upon its own particular facts and circum22
stances.
Suits in which a jury trial is demanded have been removed from
the mandatory dismissal provisions of rule 41(e) by the 1965
amendment: "This section does not apply to any action or proceeding wherein a jury trial has been demanded." ' According to Senator A. T. Montoya, who introduced the amendment in the New
Mexico legislature, juries are not regularly impaneled in many
21. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
22. Martin v. Leonard Motor-El Paso, 402 P.2d 954 (N.M. 1965).
The following cases from jurisdictions having no dismissal statute furnish some
guidelines regarding "sufficient action."
Rhode Island:
Sayles v. McLaughlin, 63 R.I. 271, 7 A.2d 799 (1939). When the defendant's inaction equals the plaintiff's, and when the defendant's motion to dismiss is not filed until
after the plaintiff has resumed activity and taken steps to have the case tried, a motion
to dismiss will be denied.
Pennsylvania:
Manson v. First Nat'l Bank, 366 Pa. 211, 77 A.2d 399 (1951). When both the plaintiff and the defendant have not been diligent, to dismiss is an abuse of the court's
discretion. If the delay is due to neglect or oversight of counsel, no dismissal is
granted.
The following cases are from jurisdictions in which dismissal statutes have been
given a permissive construction. These cases also furnish guidelines regarding "sufficient action."
Oregon:
Bock v. Portland Gas & Coke Co., 202 Ore. 609, 277 P.2d 758 (1954). The court
will consider the entire record to determine if the plaintiff has been diligent.
Wisconsin:
Wisconsin Lumber & Supply Co. v. Dahl, 214 Wis. 137, 253 N.W. 714 (1934). When
the plaintiff's attorney fails to appeal beyond the clerk of the court to the judge to
set the case for trial, the statute is not tolled, and the case will be dismissed after
the five-year period has passed.
Minnesota:
Conrad v. Certified Ice & Fuel Co., 201 Minn. 366, 276 N.W. 286 (1937). The
five-year statute is permissive. A delay of five years, without more, is sufficient to
dismiss under the court's power.
In some jurisdictions having a mandatory dismissal statute, sufficient action or
a good excuse will toll the statute. The following cases indicate some actions and excuses held to toll the statute,
California:
Johnson v. Westland Theaters, Inc., 117 Cal. 346, 187 P.2d 932 (1956). The motion
to dismiss was denied when the plaintiff's attorney had promised the plaintiff action,
and then had failed to act. Cervi v. Town of Greenwood Village, 147 Cal. 190, 362
P.2d 1051 (1961). When the defendant acquiesced in delays, and at times instigated
them, dismissal should not be granted.
Illinois:
Athletic Ass'n v. Crawford, 43 Ill.
App. 2d 52, 192 N.E.2d 556 (1963). If two
years pass after the last docket entry pertaining to the case, the case is dismissed.
However, a subsequent two-year period is allowed for appeal.
23. Rule 41(e), as amended in 1965, is set forth in full at note I supra.
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New Mexico counties because these counties lack funds to pay them.
Thus, according to Senator Montoya, the plaintiff's attorney loses
control of the case when a jury trial has been requested because the
case cannot be tried until a jury is impaneled, the attorney cannot
compel the court to impanel a jury, and the time limit of rule 41 (e)
might run before a jury is impaneled. 24 The reasoning underlying
the amendment seems to overlook the fact that under the former
language of rule 41 (e) a request by the plaintiff's attorney to set
a trial date, if made a part of the record and submitted before the
defendant moved to dismiss, would avoid dismissal of the suit
because the plaintiff had done all that could be done to bring the
case to a final determination, regardless of the time at which a jury
might eventually be impaneled to hear the case.25
The fact that no jury has been impaneled might cause the plaintiff's attorney to believe that the time limit of rule 41 (e), prior to
amendment, would be tolled until a jury was impaneled. This argument was advanced by the plaintiff to save his case from dismissal
under the former language of 41 (e) in Western Timber Prods. Co.
v. W. S. Ranch Co.,2 6 decided in 1961. In Western Timber, the case
was dismissed under 41 (e) even though no jury was impaneled from
the time a presiding judge was obtained until the time the two-year
time limit passed. The New Mexico Supreme Court rejected this
argument and said that the plaintiff's failure to answer interrogatories would have prevented the trial of the case even if a jury had
been impaneled. Similar reasoning could be used to justify dismissal
when a jury has been impaneled, but when the plaintiff has failed
to request that trial be set. Because the 1965 amendment removes
jury cases from the mandatory dismissal provisions of rule 41 (e),
the relationship between the time at which a jury is impaneled and
mandatory dismissal under the former language of the rule is no
longer important.
Exemption of jury cases from the mandatory dismissal provisions
of rule 41 (e) might persuade plaintiffs to demand a jury trial, when
permitted by law, to circumvent the time limit of 41 (e), now applicable only to non-jury cases. However, this result seems unlikely
for two reasons. First, a fee is required when a jury trial is demanded. Second, most plaintiffs are sincere in their desire to prosecute and want to do so immediately. The distinction drawn by the
24. Telephone Interview With Senator A. T. Montoya, Nov. 18, 1965.
25. This procedure has been followed in Bernalillo County. Telephone Interview
With Mrs. Eloise Young, Clerk, Bernalillo County District Court, Nov. 30, 1965.
26. 69 N.M. 108, 364 P.2d 361 (1961).
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amended rule between jury and non-jury cases creates an anomalous
situation in the law. Presumably, jury cases are now subject to dismissal in the court's discretion, but non-jury cases remain within the
mandatory dismissal provisions of rule 41 (e).
The reasons motivating adoption of rule 41 (e) in New Mexico,
and the federal rule from which it was adapted, were to relieve
clogged dockets, eliminate stale cases, and, generally, to force plaintiffs' attorneys to prosecute with diligence. These are salutary objectives. There are, however, persuasive countervailing considerations to be balanced against the rule's objectives: the desirability of
giving the plaintiff his day in court and the general desirability of
adjudication on the merits.
The legislature has decided, perhaps inadvertently, to give more
weight to the plaintiff's right to his day in court and adjudication
on the merits by extending the time in which the plaintiff can take
action to three years, and by making the rule inapplicable to jury
trial cases. The supreme court seems to have adopted a similar
approach. The Martin and Beyer cases indicate a decided shift in
emphasis from a mechanical application of rule 41(e) when the
specified time has lapsed to a closer scrutiny of the circumstances
of the particular case. The court has recognized that a strict application of the rule is harsh under the circumstances confronting a litigant in the courts today. 27 It is not easy for a plaintiff to take sufficient action to satisfy the rule. He must deal with busy lawyers and
rely on their attentiveness to his case. To apply a two-year statute
of limitations without considering efforts he and his attorney may
have made after the two years had lapsed but before the defendant
moved to dismiss, is too harsh. While Martin and Beyer do not go
very far in mitigating this harshness, they do represent a step in
that direction. At least the court is now considering the record before
deciding whether to affirm or reverse dismissal. It is hoped that
this represents a discernible trend toward a more permissive construction of rule 41(e). Hopefully, this trend will be continued
even though the time limit has now been extended to three years.
It seems doubtful that the one additional year allowed the plaintiff
by the 1965 amendment will make application of the rule at the
end of three years less difficult than at the end of two years.
The best solution to the problem surrounding rule 41(e) is to
abandon the rule. The New Mexico courts have the inherent power
27. See Schall v. Burks, 74 N.M. 583, 587, 396 P.2d 192, 195 (1964).
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to dismiss for lack of diligence in the prosecution of a case. 28 Why
not leave with the courts the power to examine all circumstances
of a case to see if diligence is shown? Surely no court would have
used its inherent power to dismiss in Featherstone, in which the
plaintiff made a substantial attempt to move the case forward when
it became apparent that he could not rely on his original attorneys.
Why should the plaintiff have been punished, as he was, by his
original attorney's lack of diligence? Surely no court would have
used its inherent power to dismiss in Western Timber, in which
neither the plaintiff nor his attorney believed that the case could
move forward until a jury was impaneled. Rule 41(e) is aimed
at attorneys, but often the effect of its application is to unfairly
punish plaintiffs.
Despite the often unfair effects of the application of rule 41 (e),
it is part of the New Mexico procedural rules. However, it is hoped
that the supreme court will abandon its "on the record" standard
and liberalize the concept of those "actions" sufficient to avoid
mandatory dismissal. The plaintiff's right to a hearing and an adjudication on the merits should be paramount. Only under circumstances showing complete indifference to the prosecution of his own
case should a plaintiff's case be dismissed under 41 (e).
FRANCES FREEDLE

28. Eager v. Belmore, 53 N.M. 299, 207 P.2d 519 (1949).

